Abstract: Biosecurity screening of synthetic DNA orders is a key defense against malicious actors and careless enthusiasts producing dangerous pathogens or toxins. It is important to evaluate biosecurity screening tools for potential vulnerabilities and to work responsibly with providers to ensure that vulnerabilities can be patched before being publicly disclosed. We consider a class of potential vulnerabilities in which a DNA sequence is obfuscated by splitting it into two or more fragments within a single synthetic DNA order, where the fragments can be readily reassembled via routine biological mechanisms. To evaluate this potential vulnerability, we develop a test set of obfuscated sequences based on controlled toxins, and share these materials with the biosecurity screening community. We then collect and analyze results from open-source and commercial biosecurity screening tools, alongside a novel Gene Edit Distance algorithm specifically designed to be robust against splitting-based obfuscations.
Authors:
Shaked Tayouri-Attia1, Vladislav Kogan1, Jacob Beal2, Tal Levy3, Dor Farbiash4, Kevin Flyangolts5, Steven T. Murphy2, Tom Mitchell2, Ryan Doughty6, Felix Quintana6, Joshua Stallings6, Michael Nute6, Gene D. Godbold7, Todd J. Treangen6, Barak Rotblat3, Isana Veksler-Lublinsky1, Rami Puzis1
1The Stein Faculty of Computer and Information Science, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel
2RTX BBN Technologies, Cambridge, MA, USA
3Department of Life Sciences, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel
4Jusidman Science Center for Youth, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel
5Aclid, New York, NY, USA
6Department of Computer Science, Rice University, Houston, TX, USA
7Signature Science, Charlottesville, VA, USA